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  Interreligious Dialogue toward Overcoming the Eco-crisis
 WRITER: °ü¸®ÀÚ  (211.¢½.40.161) DATE : 09-03-23 09:40 READ : 2336
Interreligious Dialogue
  toward Overcoming
  the Eco-crisis                                - Hyun Min Choi -

Abstract

The problem of eco-crisis is dualistic in nature, in that the
human-centered view considers nature as an instrument for human benefit,
whereas the eco-centered view rejects nature as merely instrumental, according
value to its intrinsic worth apart from its benefit to humanity. According to
eco-centrism, a human being is only an individual entity which constructs
within nature. But this interpretation of a human being raises the problem as
to who is responsible for the preservation of nature? Another limitation of the
eco-centrist view is that it tends towards the metaphysical rather than the
aspect of ethical practice. Thus, we propose that a curative way to overcome
eco-crisis is through a religious perspective which supports a practical
approach.
The Buddhist law of Dependent Origination provides a blueprint for
resolving the tension between dualism and anthropocentrism. Dependent
Origination helps us to recognize that human beings and other beings are
linked as one entity. Dependent Origination is not only a view of wisdom but
also a view of compassion. Buddhist enlightenment is completed through the
practice of ¡®One Body of Great Compassion,¡¯ a view that offers a possible
Hyun Min Choi is Visiting Professor in Religious Studies, Sogang Univ.
International Journal of Buddhist Thought & Culture Febraury 2009, vol. 12, pp. 125-155.
¨Ï 2009 International Association for Buddhist Thought and Culture
Hyun Min Choi: Interreligious Dialogue toward Overcoming the Eco-crisis

158
solution to the ecocrisis. However, there are also some limitations in
Buddhism that might be detrimental to environmental ethics such as, the
problem of social practice and amorality; in other words, the moral subject in
respect of responsibility. So how can we approach these issues in a positive
way and overcome the problem of amorality and moral subject?
An answer may be found in the stewardship ethic of Christianity. In this
view, human beings having been entrusted as stewards with a responsibility to
take care of the world as collaborators with God¡ªin nature, with nature and
through nature.
Hans Küng says that our consciousness of global responsibility for the
future of humankind has probably never been as great as it is now, which is
why we acutely need a world ethic to support a resolution to the ecocrisis. In
this regard we have seriously considered the possibilities for developing a
successful world ethic through a complementary relationship between Buddhism
and Christianity; a partnership concerned with a resolution to the ecocrisis by
applying the wisdom of world ethics through interreligious dialogue.
Key words: Human centered view, Eco-centered view,
Law of Dependent Origination,
One Body of Great Compassion,
The problem of moral subject,
Stewardship ethic of Christianity,
World ethics through interreligious dialogue.
I. Introduction
The environmental crisis, with regard to its multiplicity of issues and
concerns, is a burning topic in contemporary society. Interest in environmental
problems has spread rapidly from philosophy to natural science and it is
relevant to most fields of study. But a solution is not so easy to come by for
such a complex problem. Conflict among people with different values is a
major block to reaching amicable solutions. The most obvious dichotomy is
International Journal of Buddhist Thought & Culture

159
between people who seek economic development and those who want to
preserve the environment, as each is motivated by very different values:
human-centered versus eco-centered. Those who cherish economic development
above all believe that environmentalists are impeding economic development,
whereas, environmentalists assert that the value of nature has been degraded
by the utilitarian view that sees it only as a resource for economic
development. They believe that this singular view of the value of economic
development has suppressed other essential values in modern society, upsetting
the balance of the ecosystem and creating many environmental problems.
In the struggle between environmental conservation and economic
development, a new concept of ¡®sustainable development¡¯ has emerged. It was
initially introduced at the United Nations Conference on Human Environment
in Stockholm (June 5-16, 1972) which was the first international gathering to
look at the environment as affected by human activity.
In order to achieve a more rational management of resources and
thus to improve the environment, States should adopt an integrated
and coordinated approach to their development planning so as to
ensure that development is compatible with the need to protect and
improve environment for the benefit of their population.1
It is said that sustainable development requires an integration of
environmental conservation and economic development, but as most countries
are now experiencing, even with a desire to build a common future based on
such principles, it is far more difficult to put into practice than it is to
express theoretically. It is a concept that is easy to describe on a global scale
but tricky to implement at a local level so that, if it is to have a reality, it
must seek that elusive ground between output and process, between social and
environmental, and political and principled.
In order to practice sustainable development we need to reflect on the
fundamental dimension. In other words, what is needed is transformation of
perspective or attitude about nature; change in value is impossible without
transformation of perception. Hermann Dembowski (1928-) defines an
1 http://www.unep.org/Documents/Default.asp?DocumentID=97&Article ID=1503.
Hyun Min Choi: Interreligious Dialogue toward Overcoming the Eco-crisis
160
ecological crisis as a crisis of perception about nature (Dembowski 1989,
30-37). And J. Baird Callicott shows that we cannot make sense of, or begin
to resolve, the ecological crisis without transforming our thinking about what
it means to be human (Peterson 2001, 15). In order to resolve problems of
eco-crisis, we need to change our perception about nature and humans and
reflect deeply on our understanding of their fundamental dimension. The
destruction of the environment points to both a distorted perception of nature
and a distorted perception in all our relationships. With regard to the
inter-connectedness of all beings, we have distorted not only the relationship
between humans and nature, but also the relationship between us as human
beings, and between human beings and God. The ecological crisis thus impels
us to reflect on all our relationships. Here, we will analyze the relationship
between humans and nature initially through a consideration of our traditional
view of nature.
II. Understanding nature in terms of anthropocentrism
A. Judeo-Christian tradition as the root cause of ecological crisis
Human beings commonly view nature as object from the perspective of
dualism. This viewpoint connotes the idea that human beings, as subject, can
exploit nature for their own benefit and is based on the belief that nature is
only an object for the purpose of furthering human welfare. In this
human-centered view, nature is an instrument that humans control, and
preservation of nature is only a value if such preservation furthers human
welfare.
Lynn White (1907-1987) in his paper titled ¡°The Historical Roots of our
Ecological Crisis,¡± asserts that the historical origin of eco-crisis is deeply
related to the natural view that is based on anthropocentrism in the
Judeo-Christian tradition (1973, 18-30). L. White holds that the monotheism of
Judeo-Christian religions desacralized nature. According to him, ¡°by destroying
International Journal of Buddhist Thought & Culture
161
pagan animism, Christianity made it possible to exploit nature in a mood of
indifference to the feeling of natural objects....The spirit in natural objects,
which formerly was protected from man, evaporated. Man¡¯s effective monopoly
on spirit in the world was confirmed, and the old inhibitions to the
exploitation of nature crumbled¡± (White 1973, 25).
Other authors who support L. White¡¯s thesis, especially R. F. Nash,
concur with him in tracing the roots of our environmental crisis from the
dominion passage of Genesis 1: 26-28 (1989, 90). Nash argues that the
Hebrew verbs ¡®radah¡¯ and ¡®kabash¡¯ connote exerting absolute dominion, and
as such conjure the image of a conqueror subjecting his enemy nature to
enslavement. This understanding of the Hebrew term influenced Christians to
interpret the dominion passage as a command to conquer and exploit nature
because it was given to them solely to serve their needs. In other words, the
Judeo-Christian tradition has emphasized the extreme principle that nature has
no purpose except to benefit humans. People have used the Scripture to justify
the exploitation of nature (White 1967, 1203-7).
According to many historians and biblical scholars, White¡¯s claim that
the exploitative attitude towards nature is rooted in Genesis 1: 26-28 is a
misinterpretation of Genesis (Nash 1991, 102). But J. A. Nash holds that
White has misinterpreted both the image of God and the dominion concepts of
Genesis. Nash interprets the concepts (image and dominion) within the context
of other Hebrew Testament (N. B. Since Vatican II¡¯s Nostra Aetate document
in 1965, the Church prefers the term Hebrew Testament to Old Testament.)
passages and concludes that the interpretation is not despotic (Nash 1991,
104). According to Robert H. Ayers, when Genesis is interpreted within the
context of Genesis 2, the Hebrew Testament renders dominion as a call to
stewardship (Ayers 155). C. J. Glacken¡¯s views are the same. He holds that
human beings are stewards of God¡¯s creation and not its plunderers (Glacken
1967, 168). David A. S. Fergusson interprets dominion in terms of stewardship
as well. He argues that the term ¡®dominion¡¯ emphasizes the relational rather
than the substantive sense of the Imago Dei (Fergusson 1998, 15).
This discussion concerning all White¡¯s statements leads us to conclude
Hyun Min Choi: Interreligious Dialogue toward Overcoming the Eco-crisis
162
that his Judeo–Christian position is based on an imbalance of historical data.
John Passmore, who criticized L. White¡¯s assertion, hypothesizes the
Greco-Christian tradition is at the root of the ecological crisis.
B. The Greco-Christian tradition as the root of the ecological crisis
Passmore agrees with White that, in as far as the interpretation of the
Hebrew Testament is concerned, nature is not sacred.2 But he asserts that
Greek philosophy and Christianity are responsible for the environmental crisis.
J. Baird Callicott also says that it is Greek philosophy not Jewish biblical
religion that encouraged despotism.
Newton and other seventeenth century scientists may have been
inspired by belief in a transcendent creative deity and the imago Dei
to try to ¡®think God¡¯s thoughts after him,¡¯ but the details of the
creator¡¯s thoughts were inspired by Pythagoras and Democritus, not
Moses and Paul. In my opinion, the culpable conceptual roots of our
ecological crisis are traceable to the intellectual legacy of Greek
Natural Philosophy—which may have insidiously influenced the
environmentally controversial parts of Genesis... (Callicot 1991, 110).
E. C. Hargrove also supports Passmore¡¯s Greco-Christian explanation. He
asserts that Western religion borrowed many ideas from Western philosophy
and was itself victimized by it (Hargrove 1989, 15). The Greek philosophers
(especially Plato, Aristotle and the Neo-Platonist Plotinus) had no interest in
objects of nature. They viewed nature as evil, irrational, impermanent, and
perishable and in a constant state of change. Their interest was in objects of
knowledge or reason, which are held to be permanent, eternal and unchanging.
The only value non-human creation has is its instrumental value. Is it any
wonder then, that Greek philosophy with such a utilitarian perspective towards
nature influenced the Western world to have an exploitative attitude towards
it?
Greek philosophy, with its dichotomy between nature and human beings,
2 ¡°Nature is in no sense sacred; this was a point on which Christian theology and Greek cosmology
agreed¡± (Passmore 1974).
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163
became extreme in the thought of Descartes. Descartes claimed that nature is
purely material without mental traits, in the dichotomy between ¡®res cogitu¡¯
and ¡®res extensa¡¯ (Collinson 1997, 58). Descartes holds that nature exists as a
resource for humankind and there are no moral obligations restraining
humankind¡¯s manipulation of nature. For Descartes, everything that exists
without consciousness is a mere machine which humans can manipulate
without scruples; for him, nature is like a machine, just doing repeated
movements (Passmore 1974, 21). The philosophical origin of modern science is
based on the understanding of nature in the anthropocentric and mechanical
views. After all, human beings have damaged nature by using it arbitrarily for
their interests, which has resulted in the eco-crisis that threatens the lives of
humans themselves.
Christian religion borrowed many ideas from Greek philosophy to
express its faith but in the process was victimized by It (Hargrove 1987, 15).
Evidence of Greek philosophy¡¯s influence on Christian concepts is seen in the
theology of redemption that encouraged humankind to look at nature as evil,
temporal, and something from which to escape. The Christian duty was to
mind the salvation of one¡¯s soul rather than pay attention to the welfare of
nature. This kind of theology does not encourage protective attitudes towards
nature.
Actually, dualism existed when Gnosticism was flourishing in the
Christian tradition. The Gnostics proposed a dualism between soul and body in
that the soul is good but the flesh is evil. They considered only the soul to
be important, whereas the material was insignificant. But Christianity rejected
Gnosticism as a heresy by emphasizing Jesus¡¯ divinity and humanity. However,
the dualism of this movement reappeared in Christian history (Peterson 1974,
21). The Albigen (Catarian) thought that flourished near the Rhone River in
the southwest of France in the 13th century, for example, was based on
Monism. They asserted that the Creator of the world is not a good god, but
an evil god, because this world and its substances themselves are evil. The
Human person is a dualistic being, having soul and body in an evil world.
Consequently, if humans want to go from this evil world to the good God,
Hyun Min Choi: Interreligious Dialogue toward Overcoming the Eco-crisis
164
they must go through the ascetic way that denies body and purifies soul
(Peterson 2001, 31). Catarians had a strong desire to escape this material
world in order to get to heaven. They looked down on physical life and were
obsessed with the soul. Thus, they revived the Gnostic idea of dualism
between soul and body.
We can also see dualism in the ideas of Augustine. According to him,
soul and body are partners, but not equal: the body is not innately evil, but it
is both secondary and ephemeral compared to the soul (Peterson 2001, 33).
We can see that his idea also included a hint of dualism between soul and
body. In line with this dualistic and human-centered view, Western Christianity
had no interest in other creatures. Even if scientific developments are not a
direct result of Christian thought, Christian ideology certainly didn¡¯t discourage
scientific development from creating the ecological crisis. The attitude of
Christians has at best been passive at best, on the destruction of nature and
the creation of the eco-crisis. In the anthropocentric view, the understanding of
¡®human¡¯ and ¡®nature¡¯ has resulted in nature being degraded to an instrumental
object.
C. Other factors as causes of the ecological crisis
We have already considered L. White¡¯s Judeo-Christian tradition and
Passmore¡¯s Greco-Christian tradition as the root cause of our ecological crisis.
But there are other views that also posit causes for the crisis. M. Northcott
rejects a single primary root cause. He claims the cause is complex and
composed of multifactorial forces (Northcott 41-85). For him, the root of the
crisis lies in a range of changes which he identifies as agricultural revolution,
market-economy, science and technological progress. And P. R. Ehrlich
proposes over-population as the fundamental cause of the environmental crisis
(Ehrlich 1991; Ehrlich and Holdren 1995, 12-13, 206-7). He argues that the
doubling of the human population in a short time has been one of the major
factors behind the destruction of the environment. The impact of population
growth on the environment is well understood when it is related to human
International Journal of Buddhist Thought & Culture
165
consumption and the use of technology. Denis and Donella Meadows show
that if world population and industrial production, pollution, food production
and resource depletion, continue to grow exponentially, the global limits will
be exceeded within a few decades (Meadows 1972, 187). For J. De Tavernier,
the economic cause is closely linked with technological cause. He sees the
development of technology as the most important factor that empowers
economic growth to exert its destructive impact on the environment (De
Tavernier 1994, 239-40). Population explosion, technological–economic impact,
patriarchal domination and capitalistic egoistic tendencies have contributed to
the ecological crisis. In other words, it is impossible to establish a single
force or root cause of our present ecological crisis. The environmental crisis
has been indirectly linked to multiple causes.
To summarize, the core of the environmental crisis is based on the
anthropocentric idea. That is, the fundamental cause of the ecological crisis is
the subject-object dualism in perceiving humanity and nature. Therefore we
need to change the fundamental view of the relationship between humanity
and nature. The holistic view emerges from this reflection.
III. Understanding nature in terms of eco-centrism
A. The background of the eco-centrist understanding of nature
Eco-centrism3 constitutes a radical challenge to the anthropocentric
attitudes which are deeply rooted in Western culture. In the human-centered
view, nature is considered to be an instrument for human benefit and the only
purpose therefore, behind the preservation of nature is to enhance human
benefit. However, eco-centrists reject this instrumental view of nature and
regard nature itself to have value, apart from its benefit to humanity. Aldo
Leopold is an eco-centrist who recognizes the apparently intrinsic value of
3 The term ¡°Ecocentric¡± is preferred by some deep ecologists to ¡°Biocentric¡± because it more closely
reflects the fact that deep ecologists see ¡°life¡± more broadly than its merely biological definitions:
rivers, mountains, forest or prairie ecosystems, etc., are all ¡°alive¡± from a Deep Ecology perspective.
Hyun Min Choi: Interreligious Dialogue toward Overcoming the Eco-crisis
166
nature. In his famous book ¡°Land Ethic,¡± Leopold urges us to transform our
perception of nature using a new paradigm. He asserts: ¡°A thing is right when
it tends to preserve the integrity, stability, and beauty of the biotic community.
It is wrong when it tends otherwise¡± (Leopold 1968, 224). ¡°The land ethic
simply enlarges the boundaries of the community to include soils, waters,
plants, and animals, or collectively, the land....[A] Land ethic changes the role
of Homo sapiens from conquerors of the land-community to plain members
and citizens. It implies respect for fellow-members, and also respect for the
community as such¡± (Leopold 1968, 204). His theory of ¡®land ethic¡¯ did not
receive social acceptance initially, as it was considered too radical, but the
following generation has claimed him as the founding father of the eco-centric
approach. Aldo Leopold¡¯s earlier statement provides an appropriate basis for an
ethical system based on deep ecological principles. His view is considered to
be consistent with ¡®deep ecology¡¯ in that it approaches Arne Naess¡¯
eco-philosophy. Clare Palmer describes Deep Ecology as follows:
Deep ecology was a term first used in print by the Norwegian
philosopher Naess in 1973. Naess argued that the environmental
movement had two key strands, which he called the ¡°shallow¡± and
the ¡°deep.¡± The shallow movement, he maintained, was primarily
concerned with human welfare and with issues such as the exhaustion
of natural resources. In contrast, the deep environmental movement
(with which Naess identified himself) was concerned with
fundamental philosophical questions about the ways in which humans
relate to their environment (Palmer 2003, 29-30).
Naess takes a holistic approach to ethical consideration of ecological
wholes rather than individuals. The holistic view considers everything as
interconnected; if something is isolated, it self-destructs. A key idea in the
metaphysical insight of deep ecology is an inherent interconnectedness between
nature and humanity. According to J. Baird Callicott, an individualistic
approach which concerns itself only with the moral significance of
environmental concerns cannot be the basis for a proper Ethic. An
environmental ethic, he maintains, would have to take a more holistic
International Journal of Buddhist Thought & Culture
167
approach (Pojman 2001, 52-63).
In terms of axiological insight, deep ecology¡¯s key idea is that anything
in nature has intrinsic value. This reflects the first of eight principles
formulated by Arne Naess and George Sessions in 1984 (Loy). The principle
states that: The well-being and flourishing of human and nonhuman life on
Earth are values in themselves. These values are independent of the usefulness
of the nonhuman world for human purposes. The richness and diversity of life
forms contributes to the realization of these values, while being also values in
themselves. Callicott provides a view of the intrinsic value of non-human
beings:
...How to discover the intrinsic value in nature is the defining
problem for environmental ethics. For if no intrinsic value can be
attributed to nature, and then environmental ethics is nothing distinct.
If nature, that is, lacks intrinsic value then environmental ethics is
but a particular application of human-to-human ethics (Callicott 1995).
Two ultimate disciplines develop from Naess¡¯ viewpoint. The first
Self-Realization is according to Naess, the goal at an individual level to fully
realize one¡¯s identification with nature. This involves neither a sense of an
independent self nor the loss of the self in the oneness of nature.
Self-realization is the full awareness of the self-in-Self. Individually, each
person is not an autonomous individual but rather a self-in-Self, a distinct
node in the web of nature .
Two ultimate disciplines develop from Naess¡¯ viewpoint. The first
Self-Realization is according to Naess, the goal at an individual level to fully
realize one¡¯s identification with nature. This involves neither a sense of an
independent self nor the loss of the self in the oneness of nature.
Self-realization is the full awareness of the self-in-Self. Individually, each
person is not an autonomous individual but rather a self-in-Self, a distinct
node in the web of nature (Naess 1989, 164-65). Through this capitalized Self,
Naess emphasizes, in distinction to realization of the human beings¡¯ narrow
selves, we must accept the realization of our selves as part of an eco-spherical
whole (1989, 168). Realization of an Ecological Self is an awareness of one¡¯s
Hyun Min Choi: Interreligious Dialogue toward Overcoming the Eco-crisis
168
Self in relationship to all other members of the land community, human and
non-human, including creatures both great and small, ecosystems, and natural
processes. This ¡°broad¡± or ¡°deep¡± Self is achieved by direct and intuitive
experience of natural places. Self-realization is then linked to eco-centric
egalitarianism as the second discipline. Eco-centric egalitarianism is a
viewpoint in which all creatures, ecosystems, and natural processes are
accorded equal intrinsic value (Harbold 1994). Humans are fully a part of
nature, and there is no ontological separation between our species and other
species.
So, deep ecology which utilizes a holistic viewpoint and recognizes
nature¡¯s intrinsic value, suggests a way to overcome anthropocentrism. But we
also have some questions about deep ecology. What is the ethical implication
of the two insights£­on the one hand, the interrelation between nature and
humans, and on the other, the intrinsic value of nature? Deep ecology has
suffered a decline in popularity due to the teleological question ¡°what for?¡±
This question arises out of the anthropocentric attitude that values beings only
in so far as they are good for something£­in effect, useful for our own
purposes. But deep ecology emphasizes letting things be in order for them to
flourish, not for our sake and not even for their own sake, but for no sake at
all, such that questions of utility and justification no longer apply. ¡°Letting
things be¡± challenges the basic principle of our technological and consumerist
society, but it also subverts our notion of ego-self (Loy). This brings us again
to the first ¡°ultimate norm¡± that Naess derives from the non-duality between
the human and nonhuman realms: Self-realization, which includes learning to
identify with the whole of the biosphere (Loy). But there is also another
question. Who is responsible for the current environmental destruction?
According to Klaus Michael Meyer-Abich, the concept of responsibility is used
only by human beings (Meyer-Abich 1993, 68). We cannot expect
inter-responsibility with every species of nature. He holds that ¡®reciprocity¡¯ is
not a sense of responsibility but that something exists for the other thing.
Thus, in reciprocity we exist for them and they exist for us. In this perception
deep ecology overcomes anthropocentrism, but it still has limitations as an
International Journal of Buddhist Thought & Culture
169
ecological ethic because it does not emphasize a sense of responsibility.
B. Limitations of eco-centrism
Naess points out that to see ourselves as intimately connected with
nature is ¡°a difficult ridge to walk: To the left we have the ocean of organic
and mystic views, to the right the abyss of atomic individualism.¡± At any
level of realization of potentials, individual egos ¡°do not dissolve like
individual drops in the ocean¡± although ¡°the individual is not, and will not be
isolatable¡± (Naess 1988, 165, 195). Naess¡¯ confession shows important
problems with deep ecology.
Deep ecology emphasizes a holistic viewpoint which means that
centralism becomes decentralism. All centralisms£­anthropocentrism, Singer¡¯s
animal centrism (1990), Taylor¡¯s bio-centrism£­have a center, even though the
focus might be different, as in human, living being, and ecosystem. So, even
when we expand the range of subjects having moral status to encompass all
living beings, we still cannot escape the conflict of values, as all have a
dualistic view, in the sense of human beings and nature, animals with sensory
organs that are able to feel pain and non-sentient beings, all living beings and
non-living beings. And although deep ecology has the advantage from the
perspective of holism which counters dualistic constructs, nevertheless, when
deep ecology accepts the ecosystem as the center the problem of dualism
again emerges.
Eco-centrists say that nature is a valued reality in its own right. Thus, if
human beings do not interrupt nature, nature itself maintains sustainable
balance. Here, nature refers to the ecological system that has not been affected
by human beings and in this perspective eco-centrists consider naturalness a
concept distinct from human beings. In other words, to preserve nature means
to protect it from the control of human beings.
But in here the question arises: Is there anything of wilderness which
has not been affected by human beings? Naturalness has been heavily
manipulated by human beings for hundreds and thousands of years. For
Hyun Min Choi: Interreligious Dialogue toward Overcoming the Eco-crisis
170
example, there is no unmediated representation of nature which has not been
affected by climatic change caused by human activities. In this respect,
humanity has affected every place of the earth¡¯s surface. In the relationship
between all creatures, including human beings and the world, nature has been
transformed. This is confirmed by modern scientific study and philosophical
research. Nature is not permanent; rather it has been changed and continues to
be transformed along with other creatures. If we claim that wilderness leaves
no place for human beings, our claim embodies a dualistic vision in which all
humanity is entirely outside nature. We thus reproduce a dualism that sets
humanity and nature at opposite poles.
Eco-centrists consider human beings as only a part of nature. According
to eco-centrism, a human being is only an individual entity which constructs
within nature. This interpretation of the human being raises the problem as to
who is responsible for the preservation of nature? This understanding of the
human in eco-centrism is related to the egalitarianism of deep ecology.
According to social ecologists, deep ecology fails to realize the
nature-social connection and fails to realize that our conceptual understanding
of nature and subsequent attitudes are reflected in our social structures and
attitudes. The problem is not human beings or human-centeredness but
particular socio-economic systems. We cannot solve the problem of our
relation to nature without solving fundamental social problems. Deep ecology
also ignores the plight of particular social groups that need special attention
because of the injustice and oppression they suffer. Social ecologists hold that
deep ecology misses the important difference in their criticism of
anthropocentrism. Deep ecology needs to recognize that many people are
oppressed by the domination worldview. In particular, social ecologists have
accused deep ecologists of neglecting the issues of class and race and that
deep ecology overlooks the significance of authoritarianism, hierarchy, and the
nation-state as causal in respect of environmental and social problems.
According to eco-feminists, ¡°Deep ecology fails to realize that our
conceptions and attitudes toward nature reflect our conceptions and attitudes
toward women. Women and nature have been treated similarly and the
International Journal of Buddhist Thought & Culture
171
environmental problem is not anthropocentrism but androcentrism:
male-centeredness, which has allowed males to exploit both women and nature.
Hence, we cannot solve the problem of our relation to nature without solving
the problem of sexism.¡±
Another limitation of deep ecology is that it has a tendency to the
metaphysical aspect rather than the ethical practice aspect. This is reflected in
Neass¡¯ expression as he admits he is ¡®not much interested in ethics or moral
s....(Since) Ethics follows from how we experience the world¡¯ (Fox 1990,
219). But today¡¯s eco-crisis requires the ecological ethic that has a strong
power of execution. Deep ecology with its strong preference for philosophical
vision is weak in its practical ability. Max Oelschleeger criticizes
environmental philosophy for being too technical and narrowly addressed to
academic specialists:
The ethical theory of the professional environmental ethics
community is powerless to overcome the pervasive influence of
utilitarian individualism, an ideology institutionalized in political and
economic institutions. Further, eco-philosophical discourse offers its
ethical insights and ecological panaceas in a language inaccessible to
lay publics (Peterson 2001, 7).
So how and where can we find an alternative that has a more practical
vision?
In White¡¯s criticism, Christianity has caused the eco-crisis because of its
anthropocentric and dualistic view. Since the root of the eco-crisis is based on
religion, we have to find the cure for the restoration of the environment in
religion. ¡°What people do about their ecology depends on what they think
about themselves in relation to things around them. Human ecology is deeply
conditioned by beliefs about our nature and destiny, that is, by religion¡±
(White 1967; reproduced in Barr 1971, 10). Max Oelschleeger holds that we
can restore the sense of holiness of all living beings through religion (2001,
6). His assertion is similar to that of Thomas Berry who said that religion is
the only way to motivate change in the world along with education,
enterprises and government (Hope and Young 1989, 750). Anna Peterson said
Hyun Min Choi: Interreligious Dialogue toward Overcoming the Eco-crisis
172
that we must learn from religion how to live ethically. In contrast to secular
ethics, religious ethics is more an ethics of living. Peterson asserts that
religions have some potential in defining ethics for living (Peterson 2001, 20).
As Hans Küng mentioned, there is one thing that those who have no
religion cannot do, even if in fact they want to accept unconditional moral
norms for themselves: they cannot give a reason for the absoluteness and
universality of ethical obligation. An unconditional view claims that a
¡®categorical ought¡¯ cannot be derived from the finite conditions of human
existence, from human urgencies and needs. And even an independent abstract
¡®human nature¡¯ or idea of humanity¡¯ (as a legitimating authority) can hardly
put an unconditional obligation on anyone for anything. Even a ¡®duty for
humankind to survive¡¯ can hardly be demonstrated conclusively in a rational
way (Küng 1991, 52). This is why we should try to find a curative way to
overcome the eco-crisis through religions.
IV. Buddhist thought as a resolution to the ecocrisis
A. Understanding of self based on Dependent Origination
In our earlier discussion about understanding nature, we mentioned that
the core of the ecocrisis is dualism and anthropocentrism. If we do not
overcome these ideas it will be difficult to resolve environmental problems.
Environmentalists are interested in Buddhism because they think that Buddhist
thought offers a means to resolve dualism and anthropocentrism. Gary Snyder,
a Buddhist scholar, asserts that ecocrisis is caused by what may be called
anthropocentrism, that is, the view that nature is inferior to human beings. He
claims that we need to become free from anthropocentrism through the
wisdom of Dependent Origination. Buddha expressed his experience of
enlightenment as the truth of Dependent Origination: ¡°When this is, that is.
From the arising of this comes the arising of that. When this isn¡¯t, that isn¡¯t.
From the cessation of this comes the cessation of that¡± (SN, 12. 61). In
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simple terms, all things are interrelated.
The ontological view of Dependent Origination is deeply connected
with Buddha¡¯s teaching that ¡°all things within Samsara are impermanent¡± and
¡°all things are ¡®absence of separate self¡¯ or no-self.¡± No-self refers to anatta
(Pāli) or anātman (Sanskrit). One scholar describes it as ¡°meaning
non-selfhood, the absence of limiting self-identity in people and things¡±
(Rawson 1991, 11). Its opposite is atta (Pāli) or ātman (Sanskrit), which is
the idea of a subjective soul or self that survives rebirth and which was
explicitly rejected by the Buddha. In other words, Buddhists say that
everything is in a constant state of flow and change and there is no essence
that persists unchanged throughout life, nor is there is there any thing such as
an abiding self.
As such, the concept of no-self is based on Dependent Origination
which is the fundamental understanding of existence in Buddhism. From an
ontological perspective, mountains are deeply related to other things, so
mountains and the presence of sun, water, land, etc, constitute an
inter-dependent reality; in contrast to the passive view that the reality of
mountains does not exist. The doctrine of Dependent Origination in early
Buddhism is reinterpreted as Dharma Dependent Origination in the Flower
Garland Sutra, one of Mahayana Buddhist Scriptures. According to this
Scripture, all things, from the smallest parts to the total Universe, are linked
by endless overlapping mutual dependence. The story of Indra¡¯s Net in the
Flower Garland Sutra illustrates the remarkable interconnection of reality. This
story tells how each jewel in Indra¡¯s jeweled net reflects all the others in the
universe. The scripture says that ¡°there are all things in the one and there is
one in all things, one is all things and all things are one.¡±
The Dharma Dependent Origination is the view that all things are
related to each other. Accordingly, Buddhists say that self is not independent;
rather that individual existence is inter-dependent being that is internally
related to all things. It is thus a fallacy in the Buddhist view that self is
independent and real. The Buddhist view that human beings are interdependent
with all things, and all things are interconnected with each other, helps to free
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174
us from self-centeredness and dualism which are characteristic of Western
thought. From this perspective we can transcend the dichotomy between ¡®res
cogitu¡¯ and ¡®res extensa¡¯ in the thought of Descartes.
Can we then suggest from our earlier consideration of Naess¡¯ view of
Self-realization, that there may be some striking similarities between the deep
ecologists¡¯ conception of Self-Realization and the conception of Zen
awakening? Naess¡¯ holistic view was much inspired by Zen Buddhism; he
especially acknowledged Dōgen as a major inspiration (Curtin 241; James
2004, 76), Bill Devall and George Sessions refer approvingly to Zen in
articulating their conception of deep ecology (Pojman 2001, 158). Warwick
Fox concludes his influential Toward a Transpersonal Ecology with a
quotation from Dōgen arguing that Zen is based on what he calls an
¡°ontologically based identification,¡± a profound awareness of ¡°the fact that
things are,¡± which has important implications for environmental philosophy
(Fox 1990, 250-51, 268).
But even though deep ecology is influenced by Zen Buddhism there is
a difference between the Self-realization of deep ecology and the awakening of
no-self in Buddhism. As we have seen, Buddhists deny the existence of
ātman. Yet, Naess¡¯ Self-realization presupposes a substantial self (ātman) as he
refers sympathetically to Advaita vedānata in articulating his position, and so
encourages the idea that realizing one¡¯s self is to realize one¡¯s identity with
some metaphysical Absolute£­Brahman, perhaps (Naess 2001, 151-53). We
must then conclude that the idea of self-realization is at odds with Zen.
In the Buddhist understanding of self as no-self, the real meaning of
this expression is that human beings exist only through the interrelationship of
all things, rather than the passive view that self does not exist. When we
perceive our interrelationship with nature we can realize that the death of
nature is deeply linked with our lives. Buddhist thought helps us to overcome
the attitude that human beings and nature are independent. The Buddhist
understanding of human beings which is based on the doctrine of Dependence
Origination is deeply related to the understanding of nature.
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B. Understanding nature through the thought of Buddha-nature
In the Mahaparinirvana sutra, ¡°All sentient beings without exception
have Buddha-nature.¡± The notion that beings possess Buddha-nature means that
all beings are like a seed destined to ripen into Buddha-hood. Dōgen, on the
other hand, asserted that the sentence should be reread as ¡°All is sentient
being, all beings are (all being is) the Buddha nature¡± (James 2004, 66).
Dōgen also rejected the idea expressed in the tathagata-garbha tradition - that
Buddha-nature is permanent. He proclaimed, on the contrary, that the very
impermanence of grass and tree and forest, is the Buddha-nature (Dumoulin
2005, 85). Hee Jin Kim says that Dōgen identified Buddha-nature with Tathata
or Dharmata, although the meaning of Buddha nature here is translated from
psychological to universal. Dōgen shifted the meaning of Buddha-nature from
Immanence of Buddha Nature to actualization of Buddha-Nature. The previous
view of Buddha nature is that all beings have Buddha-nature, but Dōgen
suggests that everything including nature is Buddha-nature.
In this view, Dōgen recognizes the Buddha-nature of non-sentient beings.
Dōgen says that all things, including plants and trees and territories and the
hosts of heaven, are living beings with mind because they are Buddha-nature.
By acknowledging the Buddha-nature of non-sentient beings, Dōgen dismissed
the general idea that Buddha-nature may be restricted to sentient beings.
Recognizing the Buddha-nature of non-sentient beings, Dōgen believes that
mountains and rivers and earth are also beings that speak a message. There is
a chapter in ¡°Shobo Genzo¡± titled Sansui Kyo, which means ¡®scripture of
mountains and waters.¡¯ Dōgen said that mountains and waters themselves are a
kind of scripture, because they have implied Speeches of Truth. In essence,
mountains and waters are not dead beings, but living aspects of Dharma¡ª
Body.
In the chapter Kisei-Sanshiki (The Voices of the River Valley and the
Form of the Mountains) in ¡°Shobo Genzo,¡± Dōgen said that the sound of the
stream is the truth of Dharma and the light of the mountain is the speech of
Dharma-body, as in the example of Su Shi (áÌãÜ, 1037-?, áÔöà áÌÔÔ÷ç) who,
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on hearing the sound of streams, recognized the sound as the truth of
Dharma.4 Thus, Dōgen says that when we have practiced correctly, we can
recognize the sounds of streams and mountains and the shapes of valleys and
mountains. And all of them are the hymns of 84,000 Sutras.
In light of this understanding, Dōgen says that if we are enlightened by
the truth we can fully understand the fact that nature is living and always
speaks the truth. In Dōgen¡¯s view, the phrase ¡°green mountains are always
walking and mountains have been active¡± is not a vague kōan ÍëäÐ5, but
factual truth. That is, mountains have been active since the Empty Eon. The
hidden meaning of mountains is that they are the beings of time.
This idea will become clear only when we keep in mind his view that
time is being; that nature is active and living. This is to say that, not only
human beings but also nature is a being of time. It is difficult to recognize
this because there is a difference between the time of human beings and the
time of nature. Dōgen speaks of the long and slow movement of mountains
through many eons of time. On this point, he said that ¡°mountains and waters
are right now, the actualization of the ancient Buddha way.¡± Because of the
time nature needs for processing, this helps us to be released from the view
that nature is a mechanical and closed system. In a human-centered viewpoint
we think that mountains and rivers are dead, but, if we awaken the truth we
can recognize nature as a living being. Dōgen¡¯s view of Buddha-nature helps
us to recognize that nature is a living and active being and we need only to
change our perception of nature to see it in this way. A new relationship
between nature and human beings is called for, a homogenized view where
both are living and active.
As we discussed previously, all beings are interrelated from the
viewpoint of non-self and impermanence. This is based on Dependent
Origination and the non-sentience of Buddha-nature, according to Dōgen. In
this respect, we can consider Dependent Origination not only from the view of
wisdom but also compassion. This is the meaning of the enlightenment, that
4 http://www.shomonji.or.jp/soroku/genzou.htm.
5 A Kōan is a short story or question that can be used to inspire students to realize their true nature.
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177
¡®One Body of Great Compassion¡¯ is completed through the practice of ¡®One
Body of Great Compassion.¡¯
C. The interrelation of wisdom
and compassion through ¡®One Body of Great Compassion¡¯
The view of dependent origination which states that every entity exists
because of its interrelationship, helps us to recognize that my existence and
the existence of the other are linked as one entity. When we recognized the
fact that my life is linked with the lives of all other beings, we can awaken
to the fact that the tranquility of all other beings is my tranquility. The Great
Compassion reached its climax in the ¡®Bodhisattva path¡¯ of Mahayana
Buddhism. There is a famous phrase related to great compassion toward all
living things that offers consolation to the invalid in the Vimalakirti Sutra.
Vimalakirti replied, ¡°Manjusri, my sickness comes from ignorance and the
thirst for existence and it will last as long as do the sicknesses of all living
beings.¡± In other words, Vimalakirti is saying his body and the beings of all
bodies are one body. The phrase, ¡°Were all living beings to be free from
sickness I also would not be sick,¡± captures the meaning of the ¡®One Body of
Great Compassion.¡¯
This kind of compassion applies to both human and non-sentient beings.
From the Buddhist standpoint, a human being is the resultant person, and
nature is the dependent condition or environment, e. g. country, family,
possessions, etc. and there is non-duality between humanity and nature. This
idea of non-duality between humanity and nature is another aspect of
Dependent Origination. A few years ago, there was a report about a Korean
Buddhist nun, Jiyul, who fasted for 100 days. She was protesting against the
construction of a controversial rail tunnel through Cheonseong Mountain in
South Gyeongsang Province over the previous two years. She said that she
had heard the mountain cry when it was broken by machines, and she
promised at that time to rescue the mountain and so, put her life on the line
in fighting to save the mountain. Her hunger strike was the practice of great
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178
compassion based on the idea of non-duality between human beings and
nature. Jiyul¡¯s story vividly illustrates what we mean by this great compassion,
¡°Were all living beings to be free from sickness, the Bodhisattva also would
be free of sickness.¡±
The great compassion of Dependent Origination offers wisdom for a
possible solution to the eco-crisis. But although Buddhism proposes a
perspective for overcoming the dualistic viewpoint of Western Christianity,
there are still some limitations to it to be used as the framework for effective
environmental ethics.
D. The limitations of Buddhism as an environmental ethic
Firstly, a serious limitation that prevents Buddhism from offering a
suitable framework for an effective environmental ethic is the problem of
social practice. Theoretically, the target of Buddhist enlightenment is a
harmonic relationship between wisdom and compassion. Buddhists say that if
we become enlightened, we recognize the interrelationship of all beings and
we will have compassion for all beings. But in reality, we see cases in which
individual enlightenment has not been sublimated into social practice. Gary
Snyder said that Buddhism has an amazing insight on the nature of self, but
this insight cannot be sublimated into harmony between wisdom and the social
practice of compassion. Traditional Buddhism, or instrumental Buddhism, has
overemphasized enlightenment for one¡¯s own salvation, resulting in a passive
attitude towards social practice and world affairs. Snyder asserts that we have
to extend our community from Buddhist Sangha to the life-community of all
beings (Snyder 1980, 15-16). His assertion is good advice to enable a shift in
Buddhist practice in order to incorporate integration into lifestyle, this practice
having been lost in the Buddhist tradition.
Secondly, the enlightenment of Zen Buddhism is characterized by
amorality.6 Mumon (1183-1260) claims that ¡°Thinking good and evil is
6 I am using the term ¡®amoral¡¯ in a loose sense to encompass the accusation that Zen is in fact immoral.
Historically, the charge that Zen is amoral or even immoral and anyway too little concerned with
society has been often raised by Confucian and Neo-Confucian critics. (On this, see Whitehill [1987,
11-13].)
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179
attachment to heaven and hell.¡± The rationale here is presumably that the
distinction between good and evil is the result of a dualistic perception and
that awakening, by contrast, involves the cessation of discriminative thought
(James 2004, 31). Zen Buddhists say that if you achieve enlightenment, you
can live morally without needing to make an self conscious effort to behave
morally. But the ordinary person is non-enlightened and as such, may
misunderstand the meaning of amorality, and therefore, in danger of neglecting
the moral dimension. In this respect, the overemphasis on amorality in
Buddhism is one hindrance to its becoming the framework for an effective
environmental ethic.
On another point, the Buddhist view of no-self which is based on
Dependent Origination has a problem of ethical subjectivity with a responsible
consciousness. Dependent Origination means that all beings without exception
are relative and relational so there is nothing absolute, eternal, or
unchangeable. When we consider the problem of the subject from the
ontological understanding of interrelationship, ultimately, all terminological
values and subjective consciousness disappear. In this respect, Buddhism with
its totalistic viewpoint may endanger the individual to be lost in the totality.
From the standpoint of environmental ethics, we wonder who the subject is
that is charged with ethical responsibility?
Buddhists hold that even though we have no self-identical body we can
be subject with self-responsibility. And even though we have no unchangeable
permanent substance as a self-identical body, moral responsibility and salvation
is possible. Although we are no-self; we are able to have limitless
responsibilities and practice ¡®one body of Great Compassion.¡¯ The assumption
of moral realization we need is therefore not concerned with the self-identical
body but with the no-self, not subject as substance but subject as
non-substantiality.
In other words, Buddhists assert that we need the self-identical body
linked with past, present and future existence. If we do not require a subject
with a self-identical body, there is little point in discussing morality and
salvation. According to various interpretations concerning no-self, many theories
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180
related to no-self have emerged in the history of Buddhism. But we will not
discuss this problem here; we just want to point out that the problem of the
subject¡¯s relation to ethics of responsibility is a controversial point in
Buddhism, because if we understand human beings as no-self there is a
possibility that we weaken the importance of the subject of ethics.
Buddhists have tried to practice endeavor, as we consider the case of
the Buddhist nun, Jiyul, and the practice of ¡®One Body of Great Compassion¡¯
which is based on non-duality between humanity and nature. So Buddhists
have tried to practice in an effort to overcome the ecocrisis, but today¡¯s
ecocrisis requires a subject with moral responsibility and a stronger power of
execution.
Hans Küng holds that the ethical goal for the third millennium is a
planetary responsibility (1991, 29). In the late 1970s, the German-American
philosopher, Hans Jonas, thought about ¡®the principle of responsibility¡¯ in a
completely changed world situation in a new and comprehensive way for our
technological civilization. His view involves action as a global responsibility
for the whole of the biosphere, lithosphere, hydrosphere and atmosphere of our
planet. So a new kind of ethics is called for out of concern for the future
and reverence for nature (Küng 1991, 30). In light of this view we have
endeavored to solve the problem of an ethics of responsibility from a
Christian perspective of stewardship. But our approach is not from the
perspective of human superiority in which humans dominate nature; it is a
perspective of responsibility which was handed down from God. J. Baird
Callicott says that the concept of stewardship, among the several possible
Christian attitudes to nature, has the most potential to motivate environmentally
responsible behavior (Peterson 2001, 13).
We might refer to this kind of stewardship as a ¡®chastened weak
anthropocentrism¡¯7 because it recognizes both the limitations of human beings
and also their responsibility. Weak anthropocentrism is different from the
anthropocentrism mentioned earlier. Bryan Norton speaks of strong
7 ¡®Normative anthropocentrism¡¯ which limits moral standing to human beings and confines the scope of
morality to human interests, ¡®teleological anthropocentrism¡¯ is literally anthropocentrism of goals or
purposes (Peterson 2001, 73).
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anthropocentrism and weak anthropocentrism and suggests that strong
anthropocentrism means that all values are determined by the degree of
satisfaction of human beings¡¯ felt preferences. On the other hand, weak
anthropocentrism means that all values are determined by the degree of
satisfaction of human beings¡¯ considered preferences (Norton 1984, 131-47).
Norton holds that weak anthropocentrism can make a case for harmony with
nature and the value of experiences of natural objects and undisturbed places
(spiritual experiences, nature as teacher) (1984, 131-47). We will discuss
stewardship ethics as weak or moderate anthropocentric ethics.
V. Stewardship ethics as a ¡®chastened weak¡¯
A. Responsibility as human identity
Some Christian theologians have argued that stewardship ethics should
be considered an alternative environmental ethic. There has also been criticism
that stewardship ethics places too much emphasis on human-centeredness. In
spite of such criticism, consideration of the environmental crisis inevitably
leads to discussion of who should take responsibility for the global problem,
or what guidance should be provided for moral action. We have mentioned
the problem of ethical subjectivity with responsible consciousness as one of
the limitations of Buddhism. In awareness of the problem, we try to consider
the concept of steward as ¡°collaborative identity.¡± Stewardship ethics is related
to human identity within the text and context of the Hebrew Testament.
Genesis uses two different metaphors to describe human identity. In Genesis 1:
26-27, human beings are described as being created in the image of God
(Imago Dei).
Then God said: ¡°Let us make human beings in our image, after
our likeness. Let them have dominion over the fish of the sea, the
birds of the air, and the cattle, and over all the wild animals and all
the creatures that crawl on the ground.¡± God created humanity in his
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182
image; in the divine image he created them; male and female he
created them.
In Genesis 2: 7, the first human being is molded with ¡®the dust¡¯ of the
ground.
The LORD God formed a man out of the clay of the ground and
blew into his nostrils the breath of life, and so a man became a
living being.
The two metaphors used in Genesis 1 and 2 might seem ambivalent, in
that the image of God is innate in human existence while a human being is
none other than ¡®the dust¡¯ which has nothing to do with the divine entity.
Thus, Genesis 1 and 2 present us with two possible interpretations of human
existence. Traditionally, most Christian theologians have preferred the metaphor
of the imago Dei in Genesis 1 which belongs to the Priestly Account, rather
than the metaphor of dust in Genesis 2 which is the Yahwist Account.
Because of this, the imago Dei has become the central metaphor for Christian
interpretation and understanding of human existence or identity.
According to Linn White, the fact that Christian understanding of human
beings has been exclusively rooted in the image of God has contributed to the
current eco-crisis. This has come about through an oversimplification of the
Scriptures and by an erroneous use of the image of God analogically. It
cannot be denied, however, that it has also been a critical point in the
Christian tradition as the image of God has been utilized to give privilege to
human beings to the exclusion of all other creatures. On the basis of this
Christianity, human beings came to consider themselves as separate from
nature, and so easily able to justify dominant human activity.
The biblical idea that God bestows his image on human beings actually
has its origin in royal ideology in both Mesopotamia and Egypt: the king was
literally regarded as resembling God¡¯s image (Hessel 2000, 138). Applying this
ideology to the Christian context, biblical scholars have argued that the
resemblance between God and human being does not lie in their figures or
characters, but in their roles or functions. The image of God described in
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Genesis is better understood as a divine mandate to rule creatures, rather than
as the unique ontological likeness only bestowed on human beings. In other
words, human beings should be identified as the very beings to perform this
divine function as their vocation (Hessel 2000, 138).
Besides Genesis 1, Genesis 2: 7 also depicts the first human being,
named ¡°Adam,¡± as molded from ¡°the dust (adamah)¡± (Hessel 2000, 139). The
Hebrew word, adamah, refers to topsoil, that is, the arable land. It means that
human beings from their origin have had an inseparable relationship with the
ground. Because of this intimate relationship, human beings received from God
a command to ¡°cultivate¡± and ¡°care¡± for the ground (Genesis, 2:15). This is
the vocation given to them as farmers, that is to say, land-caretakers.
Philip Hufner¡¯s definition of ¡®human identity¡¯ may be helpful in
integrating the meanings of these two, seemingly ambivalent, metaphors of
Genesis 1 and 2. Hufner describes human being as ¡°the created co-creator¡±
(Hefner 1993, 27). At first there may seem to be a dissonance in the two
terms: ¡°the created¡± and ¡°co-creator.¡± The first, ¡®human being is the created¡¯,
obviously implies an ontological dependency on God for human existence;
humans are absolutely not self-made, human lives are given as gifts by the
transcendental being. It should be kept in mind that, in the process of creating
the world, human beings were the last to come into existence; the creation of
the world preceded human beings. The world belongs to the Creator God not
to human beings. Since human beings were molded from the dust in Genesis
2, human existence is intertwined with the fabric of Nature from the very
moment of being created. A similarity is found in the Buddhism¡¯ Indra¡¯s Net
in the Flowers Garland Sutra: all the small parts originating from the total
universe are endlessly overlapping in mutual dependency.
The second of term in Hufner¡¯s above statement: ¡°human being is the
co-creator,¡± is also linked with Imago Dei in Genesis 1. Since human beings
are made in the image of God, humans are his co-creator, but this doesn¡¯t
mean that human beings have dominant power to rule over the environment.
Like God, as his assistants they should take care of their environment. Our
initial dissonance can therefore be resolved in the understanding of human
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184
beings as stewards.
Stewardship is etymologically related to the Greek ¡®oikos¡¯ which means
¡®house¡¯ or ¡®household.¡¯ In the New Testament (Lk, 16:2-3; Tit, 1:7; 1 Pet,
4:10) there are several occasions where ¡®oikonomos¡¯ is mentioned. It means
¡°house manager or supervisor¡± since the prefix, ¡®oikos,¡¯ means a house, and
the suffix, ¡®nemo¡¯ means ¡®distribute¡¯ or ¡®manage.¡¯ A steward can thus be
understood as a manager who has responsibility for taking care of the house.
Several scholars also use a similar definition for stewardship. J. D. Hall
mentions that a human being as steward is to be responsible for all the
creatures (1991, 26). Calvin also states that everybody is God¡¯s collaborator.
E. Sauer asserts that the human being is a being for the remedy of global
creation (1967, 97).
Leonard Boff further argues that whether or not human beings take
responsibility for their environment is not dependent on a person¡¯s free will
(2001, 48). This responsibility is imposed and described as human existence at
the time of being created. At that very moment ¡®stewardship¡¯ was also
¡°created.¡± Human beings as God¡¯s stewards were created according to the
image of God.
B. Image of God as a community subject
In addressing the problem of a subject who should be morally
responsible for the destruction of the environment, we see that the eco-crisis is
a social issue and the settlement of the problem is beyond individual
responsibility. When we seek a responsible-person in social-ethical matters we
find the person is different from ¡®the individual.¡¯ The individual as an
ethically responsible person must be able to recognize their relationship as a
member of a community, able to analyze ethical matters and settle them; in
other words, a public personality who is responsible for the environmental
problem. On this basis, we will determine human identity as a public
personality created in the image of God as the central Christian interpretation
of the human being.
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185
Genesis 2:7 states that ¡°The LORD God blew into his nostrils the
breath of life, and so man became a living being.¡± The breath that God put
into humans is just the life of God. In this sense, to say that humans have
imago Dei is to infer that humans have God¡¯s existence. God¡¯s existence
reveals the dynamic love of the Father, the Son and the Holy Spirit. When
we understand God through the dynamic love of the Triune God, we can
recognize that human existence is rooted in this love among the three persons
of God. When we consider God¡¯s nature in the dynamic relationship of the
triune God, we see God as relation, loving, self-giving and creative. God is
not a God in isolation but a God with creation, who makes room for a
genuine other (Case-Winters 2007, 153). So the human being who received
God¡¯s nature is also not a being in isolation, but a being with God and all
the rest of creation.
In this aspect of relational creation, the self-perfection of humanity is
not accomplished in the individual, but in the relationship of the entire world,
including nature. Human beings who exist as co-creators also have the
responsibility for saving the world. In other words, humanity has responsibility
for the environmental problem. In respect of this, stewardship is related not
only to human identity, but also to the self-perfection of humanity.
John Ruusbroec (1293-1383) helps us to understand the concept of the
person and the nature of human beings.8 Ruusbroec¡¯s axiom is that the
essence¡ªthe wesen¡ªof a human person is not his or her individuality but is a
transcendent relationship (Faesen 2007, 77). When we understand the core of
the person as a transcendent relationship, we view the human being not as a
static existence, but as a continuously creating being. The Creator God has not
only created once in the past, but is continuously creating (Creatio continua).
Imago Dei d